Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge from the Power Plant by Colton, Roger D.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 34 | Issue 5 Article 5
5-1983
Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge from the
Power Plant
Roger D. Colton
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger D. Colton, Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge from the Power Plant, 34 Hastings L.J. 1133 (1983).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol34/iss5/5
Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge
From the Power Plant?
By ROGER D. COLTON*
Skyrocketing electricity rates are a major concern throughout the
country. One factor often cited for high rates is the construction of
more power plants than are needed to supply demand. An increasing
number of utility rate cases involve claims that consumers should not
pay costs due to excess generating capacity.' Public utility commis-
sions in a number of states have recently examined the issues of
whether utility companies maintain "excess capacity," and who should
pay for such excess.
2
* General Counsel for the Community Action Research Group, Inc. (CARG), of
Ames, Iowa; member, Iowa State Bar. CARG is a research and consulting firm that special-
izes in public utility regulation. B.A., 1975, Iowa State University; J.D., 1981, University of
Florida.
I. See, e.g., Iowa, Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36
(Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 4th 616 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982); North Dakota, Montana-
Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Otter
Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); and
Ohio, Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 63 (Ohio Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1982); Dayton Power & Light Co., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 549 (Ohio Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1982); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 494
(Ohio Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980); Dayton Power & Light Co., 29 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
145 (Ohio Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1979); Columbus & Southern Ohio Elec. Co., 24 Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 4th 261 (Ohio Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1978); Dayton Power & Light Co., 21 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 540 (Ohio Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1977); Monongehela Power Co., 21 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 376 (Ohio Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1977).
Not all considerations of the excess capacity issue have resulted in an excess capacity
adjustment being made. For example, the Ohio commission in the cases cited above has
refused to make an adjustment. See also Connecticut Light & Power Co., 41 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 2 (Conn. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control 1982); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., No. 82-
0039 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n Nov. 23, 1982).
2. In addition to Iowa, North Dakota, Ohio, Connecticut, and Ilinois, see supra note
I, these states include Florida, Gulf Power Co., No. 810136-EU (CR) (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Feb. 1, 1982); Massachusetts, Western Mass. Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR)
4th 248 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. 1980); Western Mass. Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR)
4th 219 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. 1980); Minnesota, Minnesota Power & Light Co., No. E-
015/GR-81-250 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982); Northern States Power Co., 32
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 58 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980); Missouri, Kansas City
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The determination of proper utility rates focuses on four factors:
the "rate base" upon which the utility may earn a return on investment;
the rate of return applied to this base; the depreciation costs of plant
and equipment; and the allowable operating expenses. 3 The compo-
nent at issue in excess capacity litigation is the rate base. A utility's rate
base is the capital investment devoted to, and necessary for, providing
reasonably adequate service to customers.4 Rate base investments in-
clude power plants, transmission lines, office space for utility opera-
tions, and equipment with a useful life of one or more years. 5 A utility
company is entitled to a rate of return only on investments included in
its rate base.6 Inclusion in the rate base of investment in excess gener-
ating capacity results in higher rates for consumers; exclusion, on the
Power & Light Co., 43 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 559 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Kan-
sas City Power & Light Co., No. ER-80-48 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n July 2, 1980); New
York, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Nos. 27741, 27742, 27743 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Mar. 12, 1981); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 16 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 317 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1976); Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Elec. Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
475 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1981); Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 381
(Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1980); Philadelphia Elec. Co., 31 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 15 (Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1979); South Dakota, Northern States Power Co., No. F-3382 (S.D. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n Dec. 15, 1981); and Wisconsin, Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d 127, 325 N.W.2d 339 (1982); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., No. 6630-
ER-14 (Wis Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 13, 1982).
3. P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoy, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 44-134 (1964). The
traditional ratemaking equation is the following:
R = r(V - ID s ) + Ds + C + T;
T = z0y);
y = R - Ds - C - i; and
i= u(d) (V - XD');
where R = revenue return; r = allowed rate of return; V = average gross value of assets; Ds
= total amount of straight-line depreciation; C = operating costs other than interest and
income taxes; y = taxable income; z = federal statutory income tax rate; u = interest paid on
debt; and d = portion of assets financed by debt. This equation assumes no use of acceler-
ated depreciation. Thus, no adjustments are made for tax/book timing differences. Further,
this analysis assumes a static situation. Thus, no subscripts are used to designate years. A
"given year" is presumed. See D. Kiefer, Accelerated Depreciation and the Investment Tax
Credit in the Public Utility Industry: A Background Analysis 48-49 (Occasional Paper No. 1,
Nat'l Regulatory Research Inst., Ohio St. Univ., Apr. 1979).
4. See generally Priest, The Public Utility Rate Base, 51 IOWA L. REV. 283 (1968).
5. J. SUELFLOW, PUBLIC UTILITY ACCOUNTING: THEORY AND APPLICATION 160
(1973).
6. The United States Supreme Court has held:
The rate base. As a right safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, appellant is entitled to rates, not per se excessive and extortionate,
sufficient to yield a reasonable rate of return upon the value of property used ...
to render the services. But he is not entitled to have included any property not
used and useful for that purpose.
Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 475 (1934) (citations omitted).
Cf. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. City of Glenwood Springs, 98 Colo. 340, 55 P.2d 1339
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other hand, puts the financial burden for such excess on utility compa-
nies and investors.
The setting of electricity rates by a state public utility commission,
however, is not a simple mechanical calculation. 7 Rather, it involves a
sensitive balancing of the competing, multi-million dollar interests of
consumers, utility companies, and investors.8 Consumers have a right
to obtain energy services at reasonable cost.9 Utility commissions have
the duty to protect customers from undue profit-taking resulting from a
utility's state-granted monopoly status.' 0 Utility investors also have a
right to receive a fair return on invested capital." The commission
must also protect these interests of investors to ensure that the utility
can attract sufficient capital to operate.
State regulators have taken different approaches to the problem of
excess capacity. In some states, a utility's entire investment in surplus
generating capacity has been excluded from the costs chargeable to
consumers.' 2 In other instances, only the return on common equity 3
(1936); Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 190 N.W.2d 583, 606 (Iowa
1971); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Kennelly, 88 R.I. 56, 76-77, 143 A.2d 709, 721 (1958).
7. As the Forida Supreme Court so aptly noted: "Practical considerations also mili-
tate against making cost of service the exclusive criterion in rate setting. Virtually every
court considering the matter has rejected out of hand a rule that would reduce ratemaking to
an exercise in cost accounting." International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Mayo, 336 So. 2d
548, 551 (Fla. 1976). The Florida court continued: "Now and then a hearty soul, equipped
with simple faith and a calculating machine, essays the adventure of rates based upon true
costs of particular services. The feat is, of course, technically impossible for value judgments
or empirical rules are essential to the distribution of overhead." Id. at 552.
8. In Iowa, for example, an elimination of a common equity return for Iowa Public
Service Company would have cost the utility over seven million dollarsperyear. In New
York, the commission imputed revenues to the utility of over thirteen million dollars per
year. In Wisconsin, the utility had to write off over five million dollars as an uncompen-
sated loss to investors.
The Iowa State Commerce Commission is one of the few commissions to articulate this
balancing in the context of an excess capacity decision. The Iowa commission said: "Fair-
ness requires compensation of investors' interest in receiving compensation for risks they
reasonably assumed, while protecting customers from management decisions that unjustifi-
ably increase the prices they pay." Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339,
368 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
9. See P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoy, supra note 3, at 12 -13. Cf. Illinois Power &
Light Corp. v. Illinois State Commerce Comm'n, 320 Ill. 427, 151 N.E. 236 (1926).
10. This duty is pursued through regulatory oversight of the overall level of rates, the
revenue requirement. Until recently, state public service commissions were concerned al-
most exclusively with determining utility revenue requirements. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES
OF UTILITY RATES 277 n.l (1961).
11. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Bluefield
Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
12. See, e.g., Gulf Power Co., No. 810136-EU, slip op. at 23 (CR) (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Feb. 1, 1982); Western Mass. Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 223
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has been eliminated. 14 In other cases, some but not all of the investor's
profit has been disallowed. 15
The thesis of this Article is that consumers should not pay the en-
tire cost of excess capacity; rather, utility companies and investors
should bear all or part of the burden. Part I introduces the two historic
responses to the problem of excess capacity. The "used and useful"
standard holds that consumers should not pay for any excess capacity
costs, but only for power plants that are currently used and useful. The
"prudent management" theory holds that if a decision to build a new
power plant was prudent when it was made, customers should be re-
quired to pay for that plant.
Part II analyzes the three main contemporary approaches of utility
commissions to determining whether utility plant investment is appro-
(Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. 1980); Wisconsin Elec. Co., No. 6630-ER-14, slip op. at 13 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 13, 1982). But see Western Mass. Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 248, 249-50 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. 1980) (subsequent inclusion of the excess
peaking capacity on rehearing under unique circumstances without changing the legal rea-
soning which supported the original excess capacity adjustment).
13. Common equity is capital issued and stated at par value, stated value, or the cash
value of the consideration received for such no-par stock, none of which is limited or pre-
ferred as to distribution of earnings or assets. EDISON ELEC. INST., GLOSSARY: ELECTRIC
UTILITY RATEMAKING AND LOAD MANGEMENT TERMS 16 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
GLOSSARY]. For a complete discussion of the characteristics of "common stock" or "com-
mon equity," see generally B. WASSERSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE
EXECUTIVE 40-42 (1978).
14. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 228 (N.D. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 256
(N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Northern States Power Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at 42 (S.D.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 15, 1981).
15. See, e.g., Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36. slip
op. at 12 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 622 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982), Iowa Pub. Serv.
Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 370-71 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
In 1983, the Iowa General Assembly enacted legislation mandating that the Iowa State
Commerce Commission impose a greater revenue adjustment for excess capacity found in
that state's utility systems. The legislation said:
It is the intent of the general assembly of the state of Iowa to provide for the devel-
opment of a fair resolution concerning the allocation of costs associated with excess
electric generating capacity. It is the policy of this state that it is in the public
interest that public utilities subject to rate regulation, at a minimum, be prohibited
from including either directly or indirectly in their charges or rates to customers
the return on common equity associated with excess electric generating
capacity. . ..
Excess electric generating capacity is that portion of the public utility's electric
generating capacity which exceeds the amount reasonably necessary to provide ad-
equate and reliable service as determined by the commission.
H.F. 312, § 36, 70th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1983).
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priately called "excess."' 6 These include, in addition to the prudent-
management and used-and-useful theories, and intermediate "shared
risk" approach. This third standard divides the costs of excess capacity
between consumers and utility companies and investors.
Part III criticizes the prudent-management approach on theoreti-
cal and practical grounds, and advocates use of either the shared-risk
or used-and-useful standard. Finally, part IV examines methods of al-
locating excess capacity costs in accordance with the advocated
standards.
Three recent Iowa cases are used throughout the discussion to il-
lustrate the current debate on excess capacity.17 Decisions from other
jurisdictions are examined for comparison.
An Introduction to the Controversy: Two Historic Approaches
to Excess Capacity
When faced with an excess capacity issue, state public utility com-
missions historically have been presented with two opposing theories of
regulation. These theories are based on the competing economic inter-
ests of ratepayers and investors. Consumer advocates argue that utility
companies should not be allowed to charge ratepayers for the costs of
excess capacity since such capacity is not being used to produce energy
for present customers. This is known as the "used and useful" theory.
Utility management responds that, because future energy use must be
16. This Article avoids discussion of the appropriate measurement of "investment in
plant." Investment is usually measured in dollars for purposes of utility ratemaking, not in
megawatts. This is because the capital invested in "utility plant" may be invested in more
than just generating equipment. This Article, however, does not concern itself with the
broader concept of investment upon which a rate of return is allowed. It is limited to the
amount of generating capability that a utility maintains. Thus, for purposes of this Article,
investment in capacity is measured by using nameplate ratings, net accredited ratings, or
average available capability, among others. For a discussion of the complexities of making
decisions as to the appropriate means of measuring "generating capacity," see Niagara Mo-
hawk Power Corp., Nos. 27741, 27742, 27743, slip op. at 11 n.l (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Mar. 12, 1981). A commission also may need to consider the deratings of plant in order to
measure accurately "investment in utility plant." See, e.g., Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 365-67, 371 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
17. Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36 (Iowa State
Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR)
4th 616 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 339 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982). Although the Iowa commission's
excess capacity formula adjustments have been legislatively abrogated in favor of a stricter
adjustment, see supra note 15, the analysis set forth in the commission's decisions remain
valuable to aid in analyzing the excess capacity issue in general. No Iowa State Commerce
Commission decision has yet been issued implementing Iowa's new, legislatively-mandated
excess capacity adjustment.
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forecast in advance, ratepayers should be responsible for plant con-
struction decisions that were prudently made. This is known as the
"prudent management" theory.
The consumer advocates assert that ratepayers should be responsi-
ble only for those costs that they cause.18 Excess capacity, they con-
tinue, will only provide services to a company's ratepayers if growth in
demand requires its utilization. The need for a company to incur the
costs of constructing the excess is thus attributable to that future de-
mand, not to current customers. The consumer advocates conclude
that current customers, not having caused the need, should not be re-
sponsible for the costs.
The "used and useful" concept has been established through judi-
cial precedent stretching back over eighty years.' 9 For example, in the
1909 case of Cedar Rapids Gaslight Co. v. Cedar Rapids,20 a utility com-
pany's investment in gas distribution plant was challenged in Iowa. In
that case, the Cedar Rapids Gaslight Company's investment in pipe-
lines to a new city annex was challenged as not providing service to
current customers. Company witnesses countered that the investment
in plant was a prudent management decision because "in view of the
past growth of the city, these costs likely would soon be needed." 21 The
Iowa Supreme Court rejected that company argument and excluded
the investment from rate base, stating:
The evidence is all but conclusive that [the pipelines] will not be re-
quired for immediate expansion of the work, even though the officers
of the Company may have had this in contemplation ...
...The lots or others may be required some time, but no man
can determine the contingencies of the future, and it will not do to
burden the patrons of today in order to provide for possible needs of
those five or ten years hence, at least when this is conceded not to be
necessary in order to provide for equal facilities when demanded.
22
A federal court was faced with a similar issue in Saint Joseph
Stockyard Co. v. United States.23 The United States Secretary of Agri-
18. See, e.g., Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36. slip
op. at 4-5 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Minnesota Power & Light Co.,
No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 4 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982); Northern
States Power Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at 16 (S.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 15, 1981).
19. See Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 475 (1934); Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544-45 (1898).
20. 144 Iowa 426, 120 N.W. 966 (1909).
21. Id. at 436, 120 N.W. at 969.
22. Id.
23. 11 F. Supp. 322 (W.D.Mo. 1935), aft'd, 298 U.S. 38 (1935).
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culture considered rates being charged by a stockyard in Missouri.24
The company challenged the Secretary's decision to exclude nearly
ninety acres of land from its rate base.25 Of that ninety acres, approxi-
mately eighty acres were excluded as being "expansion land" not "used
and useful" for providing service. 26 In approving the exclusion of this
expansion land, the federal district court held:
The matter of including or excluding land or property for business
expansion in the rate base is the matter of who-the ratepayer or the
company-shall carry the property which is not being used to pro-
duce the service paid for by the rate. Obviously, . . . proper and
good business judgment may sometimes dictate provision for future
expansion of the business. It is equally clear that, so far as the pres-
ent ratepayers are concerned, there must be a limit to the extent to
which they can be compelled to pay for providing possible future
facilities for future business.
27
In each of these early cases, the courts noted issues that have remained
at the crux of ratemaking litigation: how the risk of carrying an invest-
ment should be apportioned between ratepayer and investor; the extent
to which the prudence of the original construction decision weighs in
determining ratemaking treatment of a later date; and the benefit that
must accrue to current ratepayers before an obligation arises to pay for
capacity. More recent rate cases involving excess capacity have ex-
plored these issues with regard to diverse types of utility service, in-
cluding telephone, 28 natural gas, 29 electricity,
30 and sewer.31
Utility management typically responds to charges of excess electric
24. The Secretary had been empowered by Congress to regulate rates at stockyards.
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229
(1976)). That statute had withstood a constitutional challenge. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
25. Saint Joseph Stockyard Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. at 328.
26. Id. at 329.
27. Id.
28. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 216 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. 1974); State v. Tri-
State Tel. & Tel. Co., 284 N.W. 294 (Minn. 1939); State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Mebane
Home Tel. Co., 257 S.E.2d 623 (N.C. 1979); State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. General Tel., 189
S.E.2d 705 (N.C. 1972). Cf. New York Tel. Co., 2 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 1 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1973); General Tel. Co., 2 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 228 (N.C. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1973).
29. Northern States Power Co., 32 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 58 (Minn. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1979); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 100 N.W.2d 140 (N.D.
1959).
30. See supra notes 1-2.
31. Quapaw Water Co., 39 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 259 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1980); Fern Lake Co. v. Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 357 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962);
Pine Brook Sewer Co., 74 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 3d 370, 375 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1968).
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capacity by stating that company decisionmakers must forecast future
energy use far enough in advance to allow for the construction of gen-
erating plants adequate to meet that demand.32 Current capacity sur-
pluses, management asserts, are simply due to the inherent uncertainty
in that long-term planning process. Surpluses result from a decrease in
the growth in demand for electricity that was unforseeable when the
original decision to construct current power plants was made. Manage-
ment concludes that if the decision to construct a plant was prudent at
the time it was made, then the company should not be penalized for
overconstruction.
This theory also has substantial historical precedent. In 1939, in
Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,33 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court articulated a "prudent management" theory in denying
a ratemaking adjustment for excess telephone plant. Declaring that
"what the Company had failed to do was to foresee the length and
depth of the depression," 34 the Wisconsin court overturned the state
public service commission's decision to exclude eight percent of Wis-
consin Telephone Company's plant from the rate base. 35 The court
stated:
The Commission interprets the law . . . to mean that all property
should be excluded from the rate base which is not in actual use plus
a reasonable tolerance for the future. . . . If the theory of the Com-
mission is sound, then rates are to be constructed on the basis of
remanagement of the property in light of experience and present con-
ditions. We do not so understand the law. 36
The Wisconsin court criticized the decision to exclude plant "without
in any way impeaching the discretion of the managers. ' ' 37 It said that,
"[wihile the Company must bear the burden of an unreasonable exten-
sion of its plant and the risk that portions of it prudently acquired may
become obsolete or not useful, it should not be penalized for failure
exactly to anticipate future demands for service in a period of
depression."
38
32. See, e.g., Minnesota Power & Light Co., No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 6 (Minn.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982) ("MP&L further contended that its current excess capac-
ity did not result from inaccurate forecasting, but from radical changes in the economy and
the mining industry which MP&L could not reasonably be expected to have anticipated.").
33. 232 Wis. 274, 287 N.W. 152 (1939).
34. Id. at 276, 287 N.W. at 155.
35. The court concluded that "the amount of excess plant does not at the most exceed
2%." Id. at 278, 287 N.W. at 158.
36. Id. at 278-79, 287 N.W. at 157-58.
37. id. at 278, 287 N.W. at 158.
38. Id.
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The Oregon Supreme Court also refused to make an excess capac-
ity adjustment for telephone equipment. In Pacpic Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. Wallace,39 the court held that the "facts do not disclose
that [the company's] construction of additional plant was reckless or
unwarranted. 40 When company investments are not shown to have
been made in bad faith, the court continued, "managerial discretion
... ought not be . . . easily impugned."'41 Historically, therefore,
when excess capacity adjustments were overturned, company manage-
ment was given wide latitude to make good faith decisions and place
upon the customer the burden of paying for those decisions.
The basic controversy thus presents a competition between two
historically well-accepted regulatory theories. One theory states that
utility rates should be based upon prudent investments. The opposing
theory is that consumers should only be charged for investments that
are currently "used and useful" in providing electric service. State util-
ity commissions must choose between these theories to resolve rate dis-
putes when excess electric generating capacity is at issue.
Who Pays for Excess Capacity: Contemporary Responses
The construction of electric generating plants to provide sufficient
generating capacity for the needs of a utility's customers42 is a long-
term proposition. Depending on the type of capacity desired,43 the lead
39. 158 Or. 210, 75 P.2d 942 (1938).
40. Id. at 234, 75 P.2d at 952.
41. Id.
42. A company is held to need enough capacity to meet its peak demand and provide
an adequate reserve margin. Many states have prescribed upper limits on what reserve mar-
gins are reasonable. See, e.g., Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 368-69
(Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982); Niagara Mohawk Power Co., Nos. 27741, 27742,
27743, slip op. at 10 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1982); Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 381, 388 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1980); Northern States Power
Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at 16 (S.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 15, 1981).
The Ohio commission strongly objects to any approach that assumes that an ideal re-
serve margin can be established above which capacity is deemed excess. The commission
states:
[I]t is most inappropriate to measure the reasonableness of existing capacity levels
by a simple comparison to some assumed ideal reserve margin. Reserve require-
ments are company specific, and what is reasonable for one electric utility may not
be reasonable for another depending on factors such as unit sizes and generation
mix.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 494, 508 (Ohio Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1980). Cf. Minnesota Power & Light Co., No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 7-8
(Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982) (two commissioners dissenting).
43. Demand for electrical energy is not constant either on a daily or seasonal basis.
Rather, demand fluctuates between peaks and valleys. Daily peaks usually are reached in
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times for construction may range from as little as six years for turbine
peaking units, to ten years for coal-fired base load units, and to as
much as thirteen years for nuclear plants.44 An electric utility must
forecast demand far enough in advance to allow new generating capac-
ity to be in operation when the anticipated demand occurs.
45
Levels of demand that are forecast ten or more years in advance,
however, are highly uncertain.46 Demand depends on several eco-
nomic variables, including price, consumer income, the level of eco-
nomic activity in general, and the number of customers.4 7 If the
utility's forecast of any one of these factors is high, then the company's
projected need for capacity will probably be high as well.48 The result-
the early morning (7:00 - 9:00 a.m.) and early evening (4:00 - 7:00 p.m.). Seasonal peaks are
usually reached on the hottest day of the summer (except for systems having a substantial
amount of electric heat). Peak periods are of short duration and involve high demand (kilo-
watts-kW) but little consumption (kilowatt hours-kWh). A number of types of capacity
are available to meet these varying levels of demand. Base load plants are used for the
amount of demand which is constant. These plants are generally large coal or nuclear-fired
generation, with high capital costs (which can be spread over a large number of kWhs result-
ing in a low cost per unit of energy) and low fuel costs. Peaking units are used for the high-
demand periods. These plants are generally gas or oil-fired turbine units, with low capital
costs and high fuel costs. See generaly R. POTTER, POWER PLANT THEORY AND DESIGN
623-41 (1959).
44. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST. (EPRI), COSTS AND BENEFITS OVER/UNDER CA-
PACITY IN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM PLANNING 3-2 to -3 (1978). This entire time, however.
is not devoted to construction. There are three steps: 1) studies, 2) regulatory licensing, and
3) construction and start-up. The actual construction and start-up time is, at most, half of
the time involved. Id. at 3-3.
45. There are a number of decision points, however, at which a utility company can re-
evaluate the proposed plant and postpone construction. These decision points exist both
prior to initial construction, see, e.g., Gulf Power Co., No. 810136-EU (CR), slip op. at 21-23
(Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 1, 1982), and during construction, see, e.g., Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., No. 6630-ER-14, slip op. at 11-13 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 13, 1982).
46. But cf infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
47. Some mechanisms do exist to lessen forecast uncertainty. The Iowa commission
said:
With currently available forecasting methodologies, it should be possible for Iowa
utilities to make better predictions of potential demand. We believe, in light of
recurring allegations by Staff and consumers that Iowa utilities have overbuilt, util-
ities should begin investigating the reasonableness of their existing forecasting
methods and explore the feasibility of alternatives.
Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at 7 (Iowa State
Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982). For an excellent description of the advantages and
disadvantages of various forecasting methodologies, see U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PROCE-
DURES FOR ANALYSIS OF ELECTtC ENERGY AND PEAK LOADS BY STATE AGENCIES (July
1978).
48. This does not mean, however, that a company must maintain excess capacity. As
the North Dakota commission observed, a utility company can generally be expected to sell
its excess capacity to other members of the power pool. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 255 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Otter Tail Power Co.. 44
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ing overconstruction to provide for demand that never materializes re-
sults in allegations of "excess capacity."
A utility must engage in the inherently uncertain process of fore-
casting demand over a considerable period of time.49 Present actions
must be based on the forecast despite of its uncertainty., The question
that utility regulators must answer is: who should pay for errors in
forecasting? State public utility commissions have given inconsistent
answers to this question.
50
Prudent Management Decisions
State public utility commissions that apply the "prudent manage-
ment" theory concentrate review on the utility industry's decisionmak-
ing process rather than on the results of the decision. When this
approach is followed, analysis of excess capacity ends if the utility es-
tablishes that the original decision to construct generating plant was a
prudent management decision.51 This approach denies a rate adjust-
ment absent some finding of imprudence on the part of the utility.
When construction expenditures are not "extravagant or imprudent,"
stockholders are allowed a full return on their investment. The com-
missions ask whether "given all those factors which can influence con-
struction and load growth, the company can be fairly said to have acted
in its capacity planning. '5
2
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 227 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981). The New York com-
mission went so far as to hold that the actual existence of a market to sell in the power pool
was irrelevant to any excess capacity determination. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Nos.
27741, 27742, 27743, slip op. at 12, 14 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1981).
49. Inherent uncertainty is to be contrasted with willful blindness as to decreased elec-
tric demand. Compare Minnesota Power & Light Co., No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 8
(Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982) with Gulf Power Co., No. 810136-EU (CR), slip
op. at 20-23 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 1, 1982).
50. This occurs not only between states, but within a state as well. Compare Northern
States Power Co., 32 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 58, 70-71 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980)
(adjusted excess capacity out of rate base; rejected prudent-management test), with Minne-
sota Power & Light Co., No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 7-8 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Apr. 30, 1982) (refused to make excess capacity adjustment; adopted a prudent-management
test), and Philadelphia Elec. Co., 31 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 15, 27 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1979) (unwilling to make any adjustment based on alleged excess capacity), with
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 381, 387 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1980)
(the evidence found lacking in the former case is present in this case).
51. See, e.g., Minnesota Power & Light Co., No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 8
(Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982); Dayton Power & Light Co., 45 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 549, 556 (Ohio Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 38
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 494, 508 (Ohio Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980).
52. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 23 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 44, 53 (Fed. Power
Comm'n 1977). Cf. New York Tel. Co., 2 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 1, 17 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1973).
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Commissions applying the prudent-management standard have
been reluctant to label a decision "imprudent" in view of the historic
uncertainty in predicting demand. In one early excess capacity deci-
sion, for example, the New York Public Service Commission held that
"while efforts to improve [New York Telephone's] forecasting proce-
dures are necessary," the particular overconstruction complained of
had not resulted from more than "the usual obscurities of the crystal
ball." 53 More recently, the Federal Power Commission 54 dismissed a
proposed electric excess capacity adjustment by almost casually stating,
"it is in the nature of things that projections of future circumstances are
rarely precise."'55 Regulators have also been reluctant to find construc-
tion decisions imprudent because of the long time required for con-
struction, which only adds to the inherent difficulty of predicting
demand.
56
Finally, a finding of imprudence in the construction of excess ca-
pacity is unlikely because of the utility's stringent obligation to provide
adequate service.5 7 It is difficult to demonstrate imprudence in deci-
sions to construct additional generating capacity58 in light of the "near
panic over the possibility of shortages of electricity" which existed in
the early 1970's.5 9 Indeed, although still making an excess capacity ad-
justment, the Iowa commission observed that "[t]en years ago, there
53. New York Tel. Co., 2 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 1, 18 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1973). The continued validity of this decision is to be questioned in light of the more recent
New York PSC decisions in the Niagara Mohawk cases. See Niagra Mohawk Power Corp.,
Nos. 27741, 27742, 27743 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1982); Niagra Mohawk Power
Corp., 16 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 317 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
54. Now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
55. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 23 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 44, 52 (Fed. Power
Comm'n 1977).
56. Id.; Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 494. 508
(Ohio Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980) ("assuming appropriate reserve criteria can be established.
• ..it is obviously unrealistic to assume that any utility would have the forecasting capabil-
ity which would allow it to add capacity in the precise increments required to maintain the
theoretically appropriate margin").
57. See Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 622 (Iowa
State Commerce Comm'n 1982). Cf. Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate
Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1962). For a general discus-
sion of the failure to provide adequate power, see Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 594 (1965).
58. Imprudence is not impossible to demonstrate, however. This is largely true because
imprudence can arise after the initial decision to construct. In Wisconsin, imprudence was
attributed to the company's failure to reconsider its construction program in progress in light
of lowered demand. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., No. 6630-ER-14, slip op. at 13 (Wis. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n Jan. 13, 1982). In Missouri, it was the failure of the company to delay the
construction schedule of the plant which resulted in a finding of imprudence. Kansas City
Power & Light Co., No. ER-80-48, slip op. at 21 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n July 2, 1980).
59. Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at 23
[Vol. 34
was good reason to believe existing plant would not adequately serve
future needs and we encouraged utilities to invest in additional capac-
ity."' 60 If the only test applied is the prudence of decisionmaking, gov-
ernment-sanctioned pressure to construct eliminates the right to
disallow recovery of the costs. 61 The Minnesota commission reasoned
that "[i]t would be a harsh regulatory principle to require [Minnesota
Power & Light] to construct generating capacity to meet what was then
a clearly expanding demand for electricity and to later penalize MP&L
for doing what it and the appropriate jurisdictional agencies found to
be reasonable at the time."'62 Under a prudent-management theory,
therefore, if a company's capacity was built as part of a good faith ef-
(Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982) (Commissioner Moore dissenting). Cf. Phil-
adelphia Elec. Co., 31 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 15, 27 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1979).
60. Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at 6
(Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 339, 367 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
61. A similar situation exists when construction of additional capacity is approved by
the commission. In some excess capacity cases, the utility company had argued that the
commission is estopped from making a rate adjustment when prior approval has been given
in a power plant certification proceeding. The Minnesota commission accepted this argu-
ment and refused to make an excess capacity adjustment. Minnesota Power & Light Co.,
No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 7, 10 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982). This,
however, is a distinctly minority viewpoint. Among the states rejecting the argument are
Missouri, in Kansas City Power & Light Co., No. ER-80-48, slip op. at 18-19 (Mo. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n July 2, 1980); North Dakota, in Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 219, 227 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); and Iowa, in Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 364, 370 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982). Instructive
is the language of the Iowa commission in an administration rulemaking order intended to
institutionalize methods for excess capacity adjustments. Ratemaking Treatment of Excess
Electric Utility Generating Capacity, ISCC Docket No. RMU-82-4 (Sept. 1979). The com-
mission said:
While recognizing we have an opportunity to examine a utility's planning process
when an application for a certificate to begin plant construction is filed, we do not
agree with the utilities who say our supervision of plant construction should end
when the certificate is issued. As has been apparent during the last 10-year period,
projections of growth and demand considered during the certification process may
not be realized due to changing economic conditions, international events and the
appearance of new national and state policy considerations. Improvements in fore-
casting may be discovered. We must make sure utility companies respond to such
changes, perhaps by modifying their construction plans. We have also seen the
effect of rapid inflation on utility company construction costs during the past ten
years, and we owe ratepayers a thorough investigation of costs associated with con-
struction of new plant to prevent imprudent cost overruns and inclusion of unnec-
essary and excessive costs in the rates they will eventually pay for service provided
by the new facility. We, therefore, reject the proposals that we confine our review
of a utility company's capacity planning process to certification proceedings.
Id. at 3-4 (Order Requiring Additional Information issued Sept. 29, 1982).
62. Minnesota Power & Light Co., No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 7 (Minn. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982).
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fort to meet service demands and to remedy or prevent service fail-
ures,63 the investment should not later be deemed "unreasonable" due
to circumstances beyond the company's control.
Shared Risk
State utility commissions that exclude part of excess capacity from
the rate base hold that electric ratepayers should not bear sole responsi-
bility for erroneous demand forecasts. Costs are apportioned because
these regulators do not attribute "blame" for the error. The North Da-
kota utility commission, for example, conceded a company's "inability
to accurately predict the future," 64 just as the New York commission
acknowledged that during the construction of a generating plant
"changes in economic conditions may result in the company having
capacity in excess of its optimum objective. ' 65 The utilities have not,
however, been treated as if their forecasts were accurate. The South
Dakota agency expressly rejected the notion that "ratepayers alone
should keep the company afloat as if the erroneous predictions had
been accurate.
'66
One of the risks that an investor in any business must bear is the
possibility of overprojecting demand and, as a consequence, building
unneeded production capability. 67 The "shared risk" commissions take
the position that the existence of regulation does not relieve the utility
stockholder of such risk. The Missouri commission observed in mak-
ing an excess capacity adjustment that "the owners of the property
must realize that they are exposed to the same hazards of business as
any other business."68 It has also long been held that utility regulation
is not to be used to insure the value of an investment, nor should rates
63. New York Tel. Co., 2 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 1, 18 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1973); State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Mebane Home Tel. Co., 257 S.E.2d 623, 633, 32 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 340, 350 (N.C. 1979) (citing North Carolina v. General Tel. Co., 189
S.E.2d 705, 727 (N.C. 1972). But see Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
381, 387 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1980).
64. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 255 (N.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1981); Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th at 219, 227 (N.D. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981).
65. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 16 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 317, 329 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1976).
66. Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 227 (N.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1981) (emphasis added). See also Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 249, 255-56 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981).
67. Northern States Power Co., 32 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 58, 72 (Minn. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1980).
68. Middle States Util. Co. of Missouri, 36 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 2d 231, 241 (Mo.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1940). Cf. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249,
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be fixed "on an investment after it has vanished. '69 A similar analysis
can be applied in an excess capacity situation. While the construction
of excess generating plant is not an investment that has "vanished," it is
certainly an investment the value of which has not come to fruition at
the time and in the manner initially anticipated by the shareholder.
70
The shared-risk approach divides the risk of loss between ratepayers
and investors and apportions the cost accordingly.
7'
Placing the risk of not receiving a full return on equity upon com-
mon stockholders is in part justified by the compensation that those
investors receive to take such risks. Common stockholders are gener-
ally considered to contribute what is known as the "risk capital" to a
utility company for which they receive a compensatory 72 rate of re-
turn. 73 Among the uncertainties that they accept in return for this ad-
ded compensation is the "danger of any earnings shortfalls, for
whatever reason."' 74 The Iowa State Commerce Commission noted
that inherent in the concept of regulation is the possibility that an ex-
penditure may be disallowed:
Investors in a utility company are aware of the regulated nature of
their enterprise and of the risk that a regulatory commission will not
permit every cost incurred by the utility to be passed on to the rate-
payers. If it were otherwise there would belittle if any risk associ-
ated with equity capital and a corresponding downward adjustment
255 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
219, 227 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981).
69. Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1944).
70. This is not to say that the investment will not come to fruition and that a return
cannot be realized on excess capacity. If a company successfully sells its unneeded capacity,
the revenues it receives will inure to the benefit of the shareholders and a return on invest-
ment will be collected.
71. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Dec. 15, 1981).
72. "Compensatory" does not necessarily mean a higher rate of return although tradi-
tionally a return on common equity has exceeded the return on preferred equity and the
debt expense. This higher return was based on the observation that in the case of default,
debt holders and preferred stockholders are paid before equity shareholders, thus decreasing
the risk of that investment. This traditional view has been challenged in recent years by the
theory that, particularly in periods of high inflation, a return on common equity is less than
debt and preferred stock returns. See Copeland, Inflation, Interest Rates and Equity Risk
Premia, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1982, at 32; Taylor and Peake, A Utilitys Cost of
Common Equity May Be Less Than Its Cost Ratefor New Debt, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 24,
1982, at 23.
73. In contrast, preferred stockholders are guaranteed payment of dividends and re-
ceive a correspondingly lower return. Preferred stock is often viewed more as long-term
debt rather than equity capital. See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 10, at 242-45; see also B.
WASSERSTEIN, supra note 13, at 42-45.
74. Northern States Power Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Dec. 15, 1981).
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would be required in our cost of equity determination.
7 5
Expense and rate base adjustments, the Iowa State Commerce Com-
mission noted, are routinely ordered by all public utility commis-
sions.76 Conceptually, an adjustment to rate base due to the presence
of excess generating capacity is a similar type of regulatory agency
action.
77
Another conceptual basis for excess capacity adjustments under
the shared risk approach is the presence of intended reciprocal benefits
associated with the original decision to construct new capacity. One
purpose of the construction of new generating plant is to assure that
energy will be available to ratepayers upon demand. It cannot be for-
gotten, however, that the provision of energy is not a gratuitous act on
the part of a public utility, but a profit-seeking venture. Further, the
amount of the total profit is directly related to the amount of a com-
pany's capital investment.7 8 The public utility stockholder invests in
new power plants not as a charitable gesture to electricity consumers,
but as a means through which substantial financial gain can be real-
ized. Both the investor and the customer have legitimate expectation
interests that can be fulfilled by the construction of a new utility
plant.79 Neither of these expectation interests, however, can be realized
without the presence of the other. Protecting the company's profits
while placing the entire risk of loss on the customer ignores the balanc-
ing of economic interests that underlies public utility ratemaking. s0
Using either of the above theories, whether it be a compensated
75. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 623 (Iowa State
Commerce Comm'n 1982).
76. For example, in its decision in Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
339 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982), the Iowa commission adjusted a company's rate
base to exclude certain construction work in progress, and to exclude a lease that the com-
pany proposed to capitalize rather than to expense. Id. at 344, 349-351. The commission
also excluded substantial expenses associated with the purchase of coal from its affiliate coal
company. Id. at 354-63.
77. A regulator must determine what rates are just and reasonable. Assuming that a
commission decides that just and reasonable rates cannot include charges for utility plant
which is not useful to present customers, an adjustment either to exclude construction work
in progress or to exclude excess capacity could be made. The conceptual and theoretical
bases for either exclusion would be the same. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTILITY
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 92 (1982).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
79. This statement assumes a prudent management decision in constructing the capac-
ity termed "excess." Without such a prudent decision, investors would have no "legitimate"
expectation interest in receiving a return on their investment.
80. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 381, 389 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1980).
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risk-taking8' or an allocation of costs based on equity considerations,
82
the investor and the ratepayer each pay for part of the costs due to
excess capacity on an electric system.
Used and Useful
The "used and useful" concept requires utility property to be actu-
ally in use and providing service to customers in order for it to be in-
cluded in a company's rate base.8 3 The standard "is based on the
principle that ratepayers should provide shareholders with a return
only on so much of the utility's investment that is actually in use and
needed to meet their demands. '8 4 This regulatory concept presents a
well-defined rule for determining what properties will be allowed into a
company's rate base. Once it has been decided that facilities are not
necessary for the provision of service, there can be no principled ration-
ale for their inclusion in rate base. This theory does not consider the
process that caused the acquisition of excess capacity, or the intentions
of utility management.
8 5
Utility commissions in recent decisions have consistently refused
to use a strict application of the used-and-useful standard.86 This re-
fusal is based on the view that the concept does not appropriately bal-
ance the interests of ratepayers and investors. The used-and-useful test
fails to take into account the degree of management error inherent in
decisions to increase capacity.8 7 Even the Minnesota Public Service
Commission, which stated flatly that "the public [should not] be bur-
dened with paying a return on plant not useful to them,"88 went on to
state that the excess plant would be included in the rate base as soon as
81. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
83. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544 (1898).
84. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 368 (Iowa State Commerce
Comm'n 1982). This standard has been established through a long line ofjudicial precedent
stretching back over 80 years. See supra note 6.
85. The theory of excluding property not "used and useful" is applied in a number of
situations. Construction Work in Progess (CWIP), involving plant which is not yet com-
pleted and rendering service, has been excluded as not used and useful. Land held for fu-
ture use, i., land purchased without a definite and reasonably imminent plan for
development, has also been excluded.
86. See, e.g., Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 367 (Iowa State
Commerce Comm'n 1982); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., No. 6630-ER-14 (Wis. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Jan. 13, 1982).
87. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 370 (Iowa State Commerce
Comm'n 1982).
88. Northern States Power Co., 32 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 58, 72 (Minn. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1980).
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the company had plans for "imminent use."8 9 Recent utility commis-
sion decisions finding the presence of excess capacity tend to fashion a
cost-sharing remedy rather than to impose the complete cost of the ex-
cess on shareholders.
Evaluation: Why the Prudent-Management Approach Is
Inadequate
Both the shared-risk and the used-and-useful theories are better
responses to the overconstruction of electric generating capability than
is the prudent-management approach. The arguments advanced in
support of a prudent-management approach fail on several levels.
On a conceptual level, the prudent-management approach miscon-
strues the purpose of an excess capacity adjustment. An adjustment for
excess capacity is simply a cost-apportionment mechanism, so the lack
of company culpability in constructing surplus generation is irrelevant.
The federal court in Saint Joseph Stockyard simply asked "who shall
carry the property," not "who is to blame." 90 As the Pennsylvania
commission aptly noted: "[t]he sudden burden of this new plant invest-
ment on the company's customers was no fault of Penn Power or of its
investors; but neither was it the fault of the ratepayers . . . [so] there
must be some sharing of the risk associated with bringing large plants
on line." 91
Whether an excess capacity adjustment is a "penalty" is a dispute
that concerns the conceptual foundation of regulatory action. 92 Talk of
"penalties" and "sanctions" implies a finding of company culpability
and accompanying regulatory intent to punish. Such an approach goes
beyond the cost-allocation that commissions have sought to apply
through a shared-risk approach.
93
Unfortunately, utility commissions can be careless in their choice
of language articulating excess capacity adjustments. Talk of "penal-
89. Id. at 72-73.
90. Saint Joseph Stockyard Co. v. United States, 11 F.Supp. 322, 329 (W.D. Mo. 1935),
aft'd, 298 U.S. 38 (1935). See supra notes 23-27 & accompanying text.
91. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 381, 387 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1980).
92. The difference becomes particularly apparent in an examination of the Minnesota
utility commission's decision in Northern States Power Co., 32 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
58, 72 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980).
93. As the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission said: "The fact that excessive
plant investments were prudent when made does not necessarily preclude the Commission
from alloting responsibilityfor their cost." Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR)
4th 381, 387 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1980) (emphasis added). Such an allocation is the
primary purpose of a cost-sharing approach.
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ties" and "sanctions" implies that a commission has rendered an ad-
verse decision regarding the judgment of the company. 94 In Iowa, for
example, the return on equity associated with excess capacity is re-
duced in inverse proportion to the extent of the excess.95 The Iowa
commission justified this sliding-scale approach by reasoning that a
company which has just slightly exceeded the amount of capacity con-
sidered to be reasonable should not be penalized as much as a company
which has significantly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. 96 Any
proposal, the commission said, which imposes a uniform adjustment
regardless of the extent of the excess fails to take into account the "gra-
dation of management error."97 In contrast, the South Dakota com-
mission expressly disclaimed interpretation of its adjustment as a
"penalty."98
The prudent-management approach fails on a policy level as well.
Narrowing inquiry to the time of the initial decision to build provides
no incentive for a utility to improve its decisionmaking process to avoid
excess capacity. State regulators have sought to address this problem
by placing upon investors part of the risk of error. As the Iowa com-
mission said: "The utility which fails to recognize ratepayers will not
be required to subsidize unnecessary expansion of generating plant fa-
cilities will bear the financial consequences of their excess invest-
ment." 99 An excess capacity adjustment should encourage companies
to engage in critical self-review of their corporate planning.
First, demand forecasting is the basis for all capacity-expansion
decisions. Although clearly imprudent forecasting will result in total
94. Why else, in other words, should a stockholder be punished if: 1) no wrong has
been commited; 2) any wrong that may have been commited was inadvertant or uninten-
tional; or, worst of all, 3) if the wrong had been specifically encouraged or approved by the
same regulator who subsequently imposed the punishment.
95. See infra notes 115-17 & accompanying text.
96. Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at 11
(Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 621 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 370 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
97. Id. The Iowa commission has either confused or attempted to create a hybrid of
the "prudent management" and "cost sharing" theories. Purporting to use cost-sharing, the
Iowa commission instead slips into a prudent-management rationale that is fundamentally
incompatible with principled cost-sharing.
98. Northern States Power Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Dec. 15, 1981).
99. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., No. RPU-80-65, at 13 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, Order
on Rehearing, issued Apr. 30, 1982).
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exclusion of plant from rate base, 10 a more subtle inattention to accu-
rate forecasting poses a more difficult cost-allocation question. In a
1979 rate case, for example, the Pennsylvania Utility Commission ex-
amined Philadelphia Electric Company's estimates of its 1977 test year
peak demand. Noting that the 1970 estimate overprojected by fifty-
eight percent and that the late-1976 estimate was seven percent too
high, the Pennsylvania commission complained of the "consistency of
the error."'' It noted that "[i]n the past, with customers paying for
company errors in forecasts with resulting excess capacity, there has
been no incentive for company planners to adopt a more responsible
and reliable posture in their forecasts of load requirements."' 0 2 The
Iowa commission agreed, stating that an excess capacity adjustment
would "encourage utilities to fine-tune their planning methodologies to
more accurately predict demand" and to promote "a better match be-
tween load growth and generating capacity expansion."'
0 3
Second, even after ascertaining the level of demand, a company
must construct capacity both of the type and at the time necessary.
Making a company bear the risk of overconstruction furthers this goal.
The North Dakota commission noted that an excess capacity adjust-
ment encourages a utility to "continuously strive for accurate and pre-
cise management of the timing of commercial operation of new
baseload plants." 104
Finally, companies should continue to review the reasonableness
of construction plans. Economic downturns, oil embargos, or sky-rock-
eting interest rates could easily eliminate the need for new plant. Origi-
nally prudent decisions may become imprudent in the face of
subsequent developments. As the Iowa commission said, "[i]n the real
world of competitive enterprise, management officials must continu-
ously rethink prior decisions as new events unfold. Those who fail to
stay on top of current events lose out to their competition. Iowa utili-
ties should also maintain surveillance over costs associated with a par-
ticular decision .... ,105 Because public utilities do not have the
100. See, e.g., Gulf Power Co., No. 810136 (CR), slip op. at 20-23 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Feb. 1, 1982).
101. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 31 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 15,26 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1979).
102. Id. at 26.
103. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., No. RPU-80-65, at 13 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, Order
on Rehearing, issued Apr. 30, 1982).
104. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 255-56 (N.D. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981); Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 227 (N.D.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1981).
105. Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at 6-7
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competitive incentive to engage in such review, the Iowa commission
concluded that "the responsibility falls upons us" to remedy that
absence. 0
6
Policy considerations call for rejection of the prudent-management
approach to evaluating excess capacity. The public benefits from accu-
rate demand forecasting, from precise determinations of the type and
timing of new capacity needs, and from meaningful review of ongoing
construction. If a regulator considers only the prudence of the original
decision to build, a utility company is not provided with the economic
impetus to sharpen these planning tools. The possibility of having an
excess capacity rate adjustment imposed in spite of the initial prudence
of the decisions provides that missing incentive.
The Potential Remedies
Assuming an excess capacity adjustment is to be made, a utility
commission has discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy. Al-
though there is little uniformity among the states, it is possible to sur-
vey the various approaches to each element of typical adjustments.
Cost Allocation
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of an excess capacity adjustment is
the way that costs are allocated to various elements of the utility plant.
There are three distinct conceptual approaches to this problem: adjust-
ment of the company's weighted rate of return, adjustment of the com-
pany's income, and treatment of the surplus generating capability as if
it were construction work in progress.
The most common method used by public utility commissions is to
adjust a company's weighted rate of return. 10 7 A company's weighted
rate of return is the aggregation of its interest on debt, its return on
(Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 339, 368 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
106. Id.
107. A company's weighted rate of return is calculated by multiplying the embedded
cost of debt, the return on preferred equity, and the return on common equity, respectively,
by the percent of the total capital structure financed by each mechanism and adding the
products. For example, assume a company has the following capital structure:
Common equity: 50% Return: 15%
Preferred equity: 20% Return: 12%
Debt: 30% Interest: 10%
Total capital: 100%
The company's weighted rate of return would be (.50 x 15) + (.30 x 10) + (.20 X 12) =
12.9%. K. Howe & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 77, at 100.
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common equity, and its return on preferred equity. The return adjust-
ments have varied widely in severity. In Wisconsin, the utility commis-
sion excluded the entire excess investment in the Pleasant Prairie plant
from Wisconsin Electric Company's rate base.108 The effect of this
complete exclusion was to deny both the return on common equity and
the recovery of long-term debt and preferred stock expenses. The Wis-
consin commission also required the company to immediately write off
the value of the excess investment as an investor loss. 109 Shareholders
thus lost not only their profit, but experienced direct out-of-pocket
losses as well. In contrast, the Pennsylvania commission completely
excluded Philadelphia Electric Company's surplus investment from
rate base, but allowed the company to recover the costs of depreciation,
operation and maintenance, and fuel stocks from ratepayers. 10 In this
manner, a sharing of the burden of the excess was accomplished with
investors "paying" the return on equity (i e., the profit) and ratepayers
paying the return of equity (i e., the depreciation). So investors lost
their expectation interest in obtaining a profit from their investment,
while ratepayers were required to pay the direct out-of-pocket expendi-
tures for facilities originally built to serve consumer needs.
Some commissions have limited excess capacity adjustments to a
company's return on common equity. The North Dakota"' and South
Dakota" 2 commissions held that shareholders would be allowed no re-
turn on equity in excess plant. Thus company investors would lose
their expectation interests in a profit,' ' 3 but long-term debt and pre-
ferred stock dividends would be recovered."
4
Iowa has adopted the most complex remedy in creating a sliding-
108. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., No. 6630-ER-14, slip op. at 13 (Wis. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Jan. 13, 1982). The decision to disapprove all of the company's return, however,
may well have been influenced by the commission's finding of imprudence.
109. Id. This is to be contrasted with a situation involving plant abandonments. In
those cases, a company is frequently allowed to collect the out-of-pocket expenses for the
abandoned project from the ratepayers as expenses amortized over a number ofyears. Since
the costs are collected as expenses and not as depreciation of rate base, no return is paid by
the ratepayers. J. SUELFLOW, supra note 5, at 72-73, 168-70.
110. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 381, 389 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1980).
111. Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 228 (N.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1981).
112. Northern States Power Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Dec. 15, 1981).
113. See supra note 15 & accompanying text.
114. This is not true for common stock. See supra note 73 & accompanying text. Nor is
this true when a company successfully sells portions of its excess capacity. See supra notes
48-50 & accompanying text.
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scale adjustment to common equity. 1 5 The Iowa formula" 6 is a hy-
brid, based on the theory that "companies which have exceeded an ac-
ceptable reserve margin by only two percent should not be so heavily
penalized as companies which have grossly overestimated demand."
'"17
Iowa's formula denies a higher return on excess capacity that substan-
tially exceeds the acceptable reserve margin than on capacity only min-
imally in excess.
Not all excess capacity adjustments change a company's rate of
return. In New York, the utility commission imputed firm-capacity
sales"18 to the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation.1' 9 As the com-
pany made actual sales to the regional power pool, it was allowed to
retain the net benefit of the sales to the limit of the imputed amount'
20
Net benefits above that figure were to be divided between the custom-
ers and the company on an eighty-percent/twenty-percent basis. This
method of calculating the adjustment preserved the company's incen-
tive to sell as much of its excess capacity as possible.12'
115. Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at 12-
13 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 622 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co.,
46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 370-71 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982). But see
supra notes 15, 17.
116. Iowa's formula is as follows: First find the ratio of excess capacity to total generat-
ing capacity. That ratio, multiplied by the net investment in total capacity and weighted cost
of equity, calculates the company's anticipated equity return on excess capacity. The pro-
portion of the equity return on excess capacity which is disallowed is then the ratio of excess
capacity to annual peak load, Ze., the percentage by which excess capacity exceeds annual
peak load. In formula form, the adjustment is expressed as follows:F Net \ Weighted\ Excess
Return Excess Capacity Investment Cost Capacity
Adjustment = Total IIn Total) of AnualI Generating [Generating JCommon Peak
L Capacity \Capacity/ Equity Load
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 622 (Iowa State Com-
merce Comm'n 1982).
117. Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at I 1-
12 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 621 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co.,
46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 370 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
118. Firm capacity sales are those sales which are of power, or power-producing capac-
ity, intended to be available at all times during the period covered by the commitment, even
under adverse conditions. GLOSSARY, supra note 13, at 64.
119. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Nos. 27741, 27742, 27743, slip op. at 14 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1981). The amount imputed included only the net benefits resulting
from such firm capacity sales.
120. .d. at 15.
121. Id.
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One remedy that has been proposed without gaining much accept-
ance is to treat surplus generating capability as if it were construction
work in progess (CWIP).122 This method would allow a company to
accrue an allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC) on
that investment. 23 A company would not get an immediate return on
surplus investment, but would be allowed to capitalize a return on the
surplus until it was allowed into the rate base. The North Dakota com-
mission has rejected this method,1 24 finding that this approach would
discourage improvement of load management and plant productiv-
ity. 1 25 Shareholder earnings would be postponed until load increased
to make use of the excess, or until productivity dropped to a point that
made it necessary. The commission also observed that the future addi-
tion to the rate base of the capitalized interest on surplus generation
would result in higher rates to future customers since those customers
would eventually be obliged to provide a return on the capitalized in-
terest.126 Despite these arguments, this method was used by the Mis-
souri utility commission for the latan plant.
27
Only two adjustments fully accord with the used-and-useful theory
of ratemaking: a total exclusion of plant from rate base and an imputa-
tion of revenues from firm-capacity sales.' 28 Total exclusion has two
advantages. First, it prevents a double recovery of costs. Without such
exclusion, a company could collect its out-of-pocket expenses through
rates paid by its customers, and also collect the price in any sale of all
122. "CWIP" is a term-of-art describing utility plant which is in the process of construc-
tion but not yet placed in service. GLOSSARY, supra note 13, at 18-19.
123. See Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 254-55 (N.D.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219. 226
(N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981).
124. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 256 (N.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1981); Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 227-28 (N.D. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981); Northern States Power Co., No. F3382, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Dec. 15, 1981).
125. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 254-55 (N.D. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981); Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219. 226 (N.D.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981).
126. Id.
127. Kansas City Power & Light Co., No. ER-80-48, slip op. at 21 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n July 2, 1980).
128. Strict application of the used-and-useful test results in total exclusion of the excess
from rate base. However, an imputation of revenues has the same effect. While, under a
revenue-imputation approach, the excess plant is included in rate base and a company is
allowed to earn a rate of return upon that investment, the added cost of the capacity is offset
by an equal "revenue" from the imputed sales. The effect is as if the plant had been ex-
cluded altogether.
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or part of its excess to another utility. 129 Second, exclusion of excess
capacity from rate base is more equitable than a cost-sharing approach.
Investors subject themselves to the potential loss of their expectation
interests in common stock dividends through a possible "cost-sharing"
excess capacity adjustment. However, even after such an adjustment is
made, if the excess capacity is sold, investors will not suffer a loss.
Ratepayers, on the other hand, lose not simply an expectation interest
but actual out-of-pocket cash and have no opportunity to insulate
themselves from loss or to seek compensation for losses. If the inves-
tors are paid to take the risks associated with capital expansion,1 30 then
excess capacity should be completely excluded from rate base.' 3 '
It is difficult, however, to insist upon complete conceptual consis-
tency in the practical world of utility regulation. 32 Indeed, utility com-
missions have tended not to exclude excess capacity from a company's
rate base altogether but have instead chosen a cost-sharing ap-
proach.133 From a political perspective, it may be that imposing on
utility companies the total financial burden of excess capacity is so in-
timidating that regulators would find no excess capacity to exist at all
rather than face the severity of this remedy. In any case, the bottom
line is that ratepayers should not bear the total financial responsibility
for utility plant that provides no service to them. Whether that burden
is alleviated by excluding excess capacity entirely from the rate base or
by apportioning costs through a shared-risk approach raises questions
of degree, not of fundamental principles.
Apportionment of Plant
Deciding on a cost allocation method does not provide a regulator
with an excess capacity adjustment. A regulator must also identify the
plants that will not be charged to ratepayers. North Dakota used the
most recent unit in its calculations, asserting that inclusion of the Co-
yote station in rate base "creat[ed] the excess capacity problem."'
34
129. This analysis assumes a sale of something less than a full ownership share in the
excess plant (e.g., a short-term firm-capacity sale). Sale of full ownership would return the
fixed costs to the seller, but would not provide continuing returns of the capital invested.
130. See supra notes 73-75 & accompanying text.
131. This is especially true if regulation stands as a surrogate for competition. See supra
note 9 & accompanying text. But see Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 616, 621-22 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).132. See supra notes 7-11 & accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 90-106 & accompanying text.
134. Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 228 (N.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1981). See also Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 256
(N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981).
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The Pennsylvania commission took the opposite approach. Stating
that the plants "have served their purpose for which they were con-
structed," the commission then apportioned the surplus to the "least
economical units" and eliminated the depreciated original cost of those
units from rate base. 135 South Dakota, on the other hand, rejected both
approaches. It said that, "[jiust as the Commission will not determine
that the latest capacity addition constitutes the excess, it will not deter-
mine that the oldest plants constitute the excess. The Commission finds
that the surplus capacity simply cannot be actually associated with spe-
cific generating units or transmission agreements."1 36 The South Da-
kota commission made its adjustment based on the company's average
net investment."'137 This method aggregates a company's total invest-
ment, including all types and all vintages of capacity, and applies the
equity reduction to the average cost per megawatt. The Iowa commis-
sion also adopted this method.
38
The elimination of a company's most recent units is the plant-allo-
cation method most consistent with the "shared risk" and "used and
useful" theories. The most recent unit is most likely the "cause" of the
excess capacity since it is the unit constructed to serve the demand that
never materialized. Adequate generating capacity would have existed
on the utility's system without the new plant.
The average net investment approach of South Dakota tends to
reduce any excess capacity adjustment that is made. The use of net
investment averages the relatively small capital cost of older units with
the ordinarily higher costs of newer units. 139 The approach also aggre-
gates the small capital cost of peaking units with the high costs of base
load units. 140 These factors result in a lower adjustment than the
method of eliminating the most recent units.
The aggregation of new plant with old, and of peaking units with
base load units reduces the effect of an excess capacity adjustment on
investor profits, but is not countered by equal reduction of the rate-
payer's financial burden. Ratepayers continue to pay depreciation, in-
135. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 381, 388 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1980).
136. Northern States Power Co., F-3382, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec.
15, 1982).
137. Id. at 42-43.
138. Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at II
(Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 622 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 370-71 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
139. See C. KOMANOFF, POWER PLANT COST ESCALATION, 14-15 (1981).
140. See R. POTTER, supra note 43, at 556-57.
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terest, and preferred stock dividends. So investors continue to earn the
greater part of the anticipated profit on all new investment, but the
excess capacity adjustment does not save the ratepayer from contribut-
ing to expenses of excess plant.' 41 A net investment approach to appor-
tioning excess utility plant is not an equal sharing, so it is inconsistent
with the shared-risk theory. It also leaves significant costs of excess
plant with ratepayers, and is therefore inconsistent with the used-and-
useful theory.
In addition to the basic method of apportioning plant, state utility
commissions have differed on the propriety of splitting a company's
plant, or its share of a jointly-owned plant.' 42 If only a portion of a
company's plant is deemed "excess capacity" by a state commission,
the question becomes whether that section alone can be segmented
from the whole and be given different ratemaking treatment. The
North Dakota commission decided that a plant could be segmented,
and based its excess capacity adjustment on only that portion of total
plant generating capacity that was not needed. 143 Both Iowa' 44 and
South Dakota145 have also made adjustments without regard to
whether any particular unit would be artificially split.146 Again, Penn-
141. Assume a utility has an allowed rate of return of 15%. Assume further that it cur-
rently has 10 mW of capacity at a total net depreciated cost of $100. Assume the utility
adds, at a cost of $200, 10 mW of new capacity all of which is excess. Using the net invest-
ment approach, the net cost per mW of the excess is $15 (20 mW of total capacity with a
total net investment of $300).
Inclusion of the new excess capacity in rate base will generate $30 in new profit ($200 X
15% = $30). An excess capacity adjustment, using a net investment approach, that excludes
"all" of the common equity return on the excess will yield a lost profit of only $22.50 (10
mW of excess X $15 net cost per mW X 15% = $22.50). Meanwhile, ratepayers continue to
pay depreciation, debt expense and preferred stock dividends for the entire $300 investment.
On the other hand, ratepayers may gain future benefits from the construction of new,
technologically improved, generating plants. These benefits would come in the form of re-
duced fuel demand and greater reliability. The net investment approach then facilitates a
sharing of the costs of these benefits.
142. The issue of whether a plant should be "split" or not is unique to excess capacity
litigation. It addresses the question of whether the plant is "used or useful." For a plant to
be included in rate base, it must be "used and useful." Traditionally, that phrase has been
held to impose two distinct tests. See supra notes 83-84 & accompanying text.
143. Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 226 (N.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1981). Cf. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 254 (N.D.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981). Montana-Dakota had an adjustment based upon a holding that
46 mW of its total 82 mW investment in the Coyote plant was excessive.
144. See sufpra note 116.
145. Northern States Power Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at 41 (S.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Dec. 15, 1981).
146. This result is inherent in the approach taken by these commissions. By simply
comparing total capacity-to the sum of peak demand plus reserve, no significance is given to
the size of the individual units which comprise the total capacity.
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syvania has differed. Although Philadelphia Electric's total amount of
excess capacity was found to be 775 megawatts, the sum of the capacity
of the least economic units equalled only 748 megawatts and the ad-
justment was made using the smaller figure.
14 7
A decision on this issue is largely dictated by its decision on how
to otherwise apportion the excess plant. By simply comparing total ca-
pacity to the sum of the peak demand plus reserve, no significance is
given to the size of the individual units which comprise the total capac-
ity. Any given unit is thus as likely to be split as not. If, on the other
hand, an adjustment is made using the marginal unit as the plant to be
disallowed from rate consideration, no segmentation of a plant will oc-
cur. Only when the excess is less than the total capacity of the new
plant will the issue arise. In that case, it would seem to be more consis-
tent with a cost-sharing theory and the used-and-useful standard to di-
vide the plant rather than to impose all costs on the ratepayers simply
because the company chose to build a bigger rather than a smaller unit.
Measurement of Excess
A third key issue is how much generation capability must be ap-
portioned as "excess." The most common method is to compare total
generating capacity to the sum of peak demand 148 plus an adequate
reserve margin. 149 State commissions, however, have differed on what
reserve margins are "adequate." Some commissions have adopted the
reserve margins required to be maintained by the respective power
pools for reliability purposes. 150 Others have considered expert testi-
mony that sets an independent reserve margin,' 5' and have used the
147. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 381, 388-89 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1980).
148. See supra note 43.
149. A "reserve margin" is that capacity which is the difference between net system ca-
pability and system peak load. It is the margin of capacity which is available to provide for
scheduled maintenance, emergency outages, system operating requirements, and unforesee-
able loads. GLOSSARY, supra note 13, at 10.
150. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Nos. 27741, 27742, 27743, slip op. at 10
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1982); Northern States Power Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at
16 (S.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 15, 1981).
The North Carolina Supreme Court instructively summarized the "used and useful"
concept as applied to reserve margins: "The overbuilding of plant may occur in a variety of
ways. For example, a spare tire is presently used and useful in the operation of an automo-
bile, but twenty spare tires carried in the trunk would be the limit of sound management."
State ex re. Util. Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 189 S.E.2d 705, 727 (N.C. 1972).
151. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 381, 388 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1980). North Dakota used the "annual peak and reserve obligation" without quan-
tifying the amount of total capacity requirement to be attributed to either component and
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midpoint of the range of reasonable reserves for making excess capac-
ity rate adjustments. In contrast, the Iowa commission refused to rely
on a reserve margin set solely for reliability purposes.1 52 That commis-
sion sought to find the reserves that were "economically justified" and
that would "provide service at the lowest cost to consumers," including
a consideration of outage costs.' 53 The commission complained that
"no party has presented us with the kind of facts on which to base a
thorough economic analysis of the costs and benefits associated with
specific levels of reserve capacity."
154
Setting a reserve margin also entails establishing the applicable
peak demand used to determine reserves. The Iowa commission held
that the actual test-year peak was the most appropriate figure:
Use of forecasted demand would provide an incentive to utilities to
overestimate demand in order to minimize the amount of capacity
we would consider to be excessive. Utilities should be encouraged toimprove their demand forecasts, not to inflate them. We prefer to
rely on what is known and measurable, that is, a utility's actual peak
load.
55
Four states, on the other hand, have adopted the use of projected peak
demands without discussion.15
6
without identifying the source of the reserve "obligation." Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 254 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Otter Tail Power Co.,
44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 226 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981).
152. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 619-20 (Iowa
State Commerce Comm'n 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339,
368-69 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
153. Customer outage costs include costs to the consumer due to a power cutoff. They
range from actual costs such as that of spoiled food due to lack of refrigeration, to the
inconvenience of not having lights, hot water or cooking, to illness or death from not having
heat. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST. (EPRI), supra note 44, at S-5. For an extensive
discussion of outage costs, see generally M. MUNASINGHE, THE ECONOMICS OF POWER SYS-
TEM RELIABILITY AND PLANNING 45-86, 163-75 (1979).
154. The Iowa commission still adopted a 25% reserve margin as "justified." This re-
serve margin should be compared to MAPP's reserve obligation of 15%. The Iowa commis-
sion rejected use of the MAPP reserve, stating that setting allowable reserves at the power
pool reliability requirement meant that the minimum and maximun allowable capacity were
identical, "a standard of precision that no utility manager can reasonably be expected to
meet." Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 616, 620 (Iowa State
Commerce Comm'n 1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 369
(Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982). See also Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27,
RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at 8 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Feb. 27, 1982).
155. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., No. RPU-80-65, at 14 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, Order
on Rehearing, issued Apr. 30, 1982).
156. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249,254 (N.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1981); Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 219, 226 (N.D. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Nos. 27741, 27742, 27743, slip op. at
10 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1982); Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep.
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The use of an actual peak is consistent with both a shared-risk
approach and used-and-useful theory. The issue involves whether the
state commission is to consider the decisionmaking process or the re-
sults of that process.' 57 Use of projected peak demands reflects a "pru-
dent management" bias by focusing on the adequacy of the forecasting
process instead of the actual extent of capacity not serving present cus-
tomers. Both the shared-risk approach and the used-and-useful theory
allocate costs according to the actual state of affairs. Use of actual,
instead of projected, peak demand, therefore, is more consistent with
these theories. For largely the same policy reasons that a process-ori-
ented theory was rejected as support for the "prudent managment"
concept, so too should the use of projected peak loads be rejected.,,
Conclusion
The cost of new power plant construction has come under increas-
ingly strict scrutiny. Many consumer advocates argue that electric
companies have built too many power plants; that some of those plants
do not produce energy for present customers; and that investors, not
customers, should pay for plants that are not useful. Reduced energy
use, companies respond, is a temporary phenomenon related to a de-
pressed economy, and ratepayers should be financially responsible for
capacity constructed to meet reasonably foreseeable demands. The
question of who should pay for "excess capacity" has confronted many
state public utility commissions in recent years.
The better-reasoned regulatory response to the excess capacity is-
sue has been the adoption of a cost-sharing approach.' 59 Such an ac-
tion allocates the financial responsibility for surplus generating
capability between investor and customer. Even if the company was
reasonable in building a plant, ratepayers should not be completely re-
sponsible for the costs of unused capacity. Excess capacity adjustments
have generally been effected through modifications to a company's
weighted rate of return.
In contrast, the so-called "prudent management theory" has seri-
ous conceptual and policy flaws and has been rejected by several state
(PUR) 4th 381, 388 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comrn'n 1980); Northern States Power Co., No. F-3382,
slip op. at 16 (S.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 15, 1981).
157. See supra notes 51-89 & accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 90-106 & accompanying text.
159. This conclusion recognizes that strict application of the used and useful standard
has not generally been made on a regulatory level. But see Quapaw Water Co., 39 Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 4th 259, 280 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980).
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utility commissions. This theory misconstrues a rate adjustment for the
surpluses as being a "penalty" to the investor rather than as a cost-
allocation mechanism. In fact, no regulatory intent to seek a punitive
retribution exists and no company culpability need be found for an
adjustment to be made. On a policy level, state commissions have ob-
served that imposing on the company financial responsibility for its
mistakes will force it to improve its planning tools in all areas of capac-
ity expansion.
Utility ratemaking involves a constant balancing of the competing
interests of investors and ratepayers. In the debate over excess electric
generating capacity, adoption of a cost-sharing approach seems to bet-
ter resolve that conffict than adoption of a prudent-management
approach.

